

Message Text

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ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 /026 R

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S/S-O:RCASTRODALE

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY ANKARA

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 079930 TOSEC 030027

EXDIS - ANKARA FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY

E.O. 11652: XGDS 1 AND 2

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TAGS: PEPR, XF, PBOR, UNSC, LE, IS, SY

SUBJECT: SOUTH LEBANON

1. WE INTEND TO SEND ON A REGULAR BASIS SUMMING UP CABLES
OF WHERE WE STAND AND OUTLINING WHAT ACTIONS ARE NEEDED.
THIS WILL BE THE FIRST SUCH EFFORT.

2. WALDHEIM APPEAL TO THE PLO TO OBSERVE CEASEFIRE: BY
SEPTTEL WE WILL BE INSTRUCTING USUN TO MAKE CLEAR TO THE

UN THAT THE U.S. WOULD NOT RPT NOT OPPOSE A SYG APPEAL PROVIDED CERTAIN CONDITIONS WERE OBSERVED, INCLUDING THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE ISRAELIS BE NOTIFIED IN ADVANCE AND THAT THE APPEAL ITSELF BE COUCHED IN TERMS THAT WOULD NOT ADD UNNECESSARILY HIGHER STATUS TO THE PLO POSITION.

3. PUTTING LEBANESE ARMY AS WELL AS LEBANESE POLICE, GENDARMERIE, CUSTOMS, AND CIVIL AUTHORITY INTO THE SOUTH EXPEDITIOUSLY: THIS REMAINS THE MOST IMMEDIATE, PRESSING OBJECTIVE. EMBASSY BEIRUT MUST CONTINUE FIRMLY AND PER-SISTENTLY TO URGE THE PROMPTTEST POSSIBLE TRANSFER OF AT LEAST SOME MILITARY UNITS TO THE SOUTH. THE SYRIANS SUP-PORT SUCH A MOVE (DAMASCUS 1723), AND SAY THAT THE PALES-TINIANS ARE WILLING TO COOPERATE. SIILASVUO HAS MADE ABUNDANTLY CLEAR HE NEEDS THESE FORCES, AND THE ANTICIPATED

POSITIVE RESPONSE BY ARAFAT TO AN APPEAL BY THE SYG SHOULD MAKE THE IMMEDIATE SITUATION EASIER TO DEAL WITH. EMBASSY DAMASCUS SHOULD PRESS THE SYRIANS TO SUPPORT U.S. AND UN URGINGS IN THIS RESPECT.

4. EVEN IF THE LEBANESE CONTINUE TO PROCRASTINATE IN SENDING DOWN MILITARY UNITS, WE SEE NO REASON WHY THEY
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COULD NOT ROUND UP SOME SMALL POLICE FORCES AND SEND THEM TO JOIN UNIFIL UNITS. THEY WILL BE NEEDED IMMEDIATELY AS THE FLOW OF DISPLACED PEOPLE RETURNING TO THE SOUTH STEPS UP TO HELP IN WHAT WE THINK WILL BE AN ESSENTIAL SCREENING PROCESS (SEE BELOW).

5. MOVING UNIFIL UNITS AND SUPPLIES THROUGH BEIRUT: WE REMAIN EXTREMELY UNEASY OVER THE PROSPECTS, LONG AND SHORT TERM, OF AIRLIFTING UN UNITS AND SUPPLIES INTO BEIRUT AIRPORT BEFORE SENDING THEM TO SOUTH LEBANON. THE FORTHCOMING U.S. AIRLIFT OF NORWEGIAN TROOPS AND EQUIP-MENT IS A CASE IN POINT, AND WE ARE CONCERNED THAT PALES-TINIAN ELEMENTS WITH ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILES IN THE GENERAL AREA MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO BREAK DISCIPLINE. OVER THE LONGER RUN, ALSO, THE PALESTINIANS, PARTICULARLY IN THE NO-MAN'S LAND BETWEEN THE SYRIAN RED LINE AND THE LITANI, WILL BE ABLE TO CHOK OFF OR INTERDICT UNIFIL CON-VOYS. WE HAVE ASKED EMBASSY BEIRUT TO COMMENT ON SECURITY CONDITIONS AFFECTING AIRLIFTS, ETC. IF BEIRUT AGREES THIS COULD BE A SERIOUS DANGER, CONSUL GENERAL NEWLIN SHOULD MAKE KNOWN OUR THINKING TO SIILASVUO, AND USUN MIGHT DO THE SAME WITH THE SECRETARIAT.

6. IN DOING SO, YOU SHOULD ASCERTAIN WHETHER SIILASVUO PREFERS TO DO AS MUCH STAGING AS POSSIBLE IN LEBANON FOR POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL REASONS, RATHER THAN USING ISRAEL. IF SO, SUGGEST THAT HE MIGHT CONSIDER USING THE

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BUILDING UP IN NEW YORK TO HOLD ANOTHER SC SESSION TO RAISE THE WITHDRAWAL ISSUE. WE COULD USE THERE AS WELL AS WITH CONGRESS AND THE PUBLIC ANY HELPFUL AMMUNITION SUCH AS A SCHEDULE OR TIMETABLE, HOWEVER TENTATIVELY CAST.

8. RETURN OF DISPLACED PERSONS TO THE SOUTH: THE CONTINUED THREAT OF IDF RETALIATION FOR ROCKET OR ARTILLERY SHELLS LANDING IN NORTH ISRAEL MAY INHIBIT THE RETURN OF DISPLACED PERSONS TO SUCH PLACES AS TYRE. IF A CEASEFIRE TAKES HOLD, HOWEVER, WE SHOULD EXPECT THE FLOW OF RETURN- EES TO ACCELERATE. SOME ARE RETURNING EVEN NOW.

9. THIS IS THE REASON IT IS CONSIDERED ALL THE MORE IMPERATIVE THAT LEBANESE POLICE UNITS BE ATTACHED RIGHT AWAY TO UNIFIL UNITS COVERING ENTRYWAYS INTO SOUTH LEBANON. THE ALREADY-BEGUN ISRAELI-LEBANESE DISCUSSIONS OF THE DISPLACED PERSON PROBLEM UNDER UN AUSPICES SHOULD ALSO BE CONTINUED. WE ASSUME THE ISRAELIS WOULD GO ALONG WITH THE RETURN OF UNARMED PALESTINIANS AND LEBANESE. IT SEEMS TO US THAT THE LEBANESE POLICE UNITS, BACKED UP BY UNIFIL, SHOULD DO THE SCREENING OF IDENTITY DOCUMENTS AND CHECKING OF BODIES AND TRUCKS FOR WEAPONS. WE BELIEVE THERE ALSO SHOULD BE UNRWA PERSONNEL AT CHECKPOINTS TO CONFIRM THE STATUS OF REGISTERED PALESTINIAN REFUGEES.

10. AS A ROUGH AND READY GAUGE, DISPLACED PERSONS COULD BE DIVIDED INTO THREE GROUPS: (A) LEBANESE CITIZENS RESIDENT IN SOUTH LEBANON; (B) BONA FIDE PALESTINIAN REFUGEES FROM THE REGION BELOW THE LITANI WHO ARE REGISTERED WITH UNRWA; AND (C) UNREGISTERED PALESTINIANS. ABLE BODIED MALES IN CATEGORY (C) ARE THE MOST RECENT ARRIVALS TO THE AREA AND PROBABLY ARE THE MOST LIKELY CANDIDATES TO RETURN TO ARMS CACHES IN THE TYRE CAMPS OR ELSEWHERE IN SOUTHERN SECRET

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LEBANON TO RE-EQUIP THEMSELVES WITH WEAPONRY. WE BELIEVE OPTIMUM GOAL THAT UNIFIL CAN AIM AT, IF AND WHEN BRIDGES AND CROSSING POINTS AT LITANI ARE SECURED, WOULD BE VERIFICATION OF THE LEBANESE CITIZENS AND THE BONA FIDE

REGISTERED PALESTINIAN REFUGEES BEFORE RE-ENTRY IS PERMITTED. IF POSSIBLE, UNREGISTERED PALESTINIANS SHOULD BE KEPT OUT.

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AND FORDING SITES ALONG THE LITANI. CONSIDERATION MAY HAVE TO BE GIVEN TO A FENCE OR BARBED WIRE.

13. UN POLICE UNITS: WE HAVE BEEN CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY OF SETTING UP UN POLICE UNITS, ALONG THE LINES OF UNICIVPOLIN CYPRUS TO ASSIST LEBANESE POLICE AND GENDARMERIE. WE DO NOT WISH TO MENTION THE MATTER TO ANYONE AT THIS STAGE, SINCE THE LEBANESE COULD HEAR OF IT AND DELAY THEIR OWN NECESSARY DECISIONS RE SENDING IN POLICE UNITS STILL FURTHER. POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTORS TO A UN POLICE UNIT WOULD BE AUSTRALIA, BELGIUM, FRANCE, IVORY COAST AND PERHAPS MOROCCO AND THE SUDAN. WE WOULD WELCOME COMMENTS ON THE CONCEPT PARTICULARLY FROM BEIRUT, USUN, AND JERUSALEM, AND WHETHER THERE COULD EVER CONCEIVABLY BE ROLE FOR SUCH UN UNITS IN POLICING CAMPS.

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14. IMMEDIATE RELIEF NEEDS FOR DPS: WE HAVE AIRLIFTED OUR INITIAL SHIPMENTS OF DOLS 1.2 MILLION WORTH OF RELIEF SUPPLIES (TENTS, BLANKETS, STOVES, MEDICINES, ETC.) FOR USE BY LEBANESE GOVERNMENT IN HANDLING THE SITUATION OF 170,000 PLUS DISPLACED PEOPLE FROM THE SOUTH. WE ARE CONSULTING IN BEIRUT WITH LEBANESE GOVERNMENT, UN VOLUNTARY AGENCIES, AND OTHERS ALSO INVOLVED IN THIS RELIEF EFFORT. WE ARE PREPARED TO DO MORE, DRAWING ON AID'S DISASTER RELIEF FUND.

15. RESETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION ASSISTANCE IN SOUTHERN LEBANON: IF AND WHEN THE SITUATION IN SOUTHERN LEBANON STABILIZES TO THE POINT WHERE THE GREAT MASS OF DISPLACED PEOPLE WILL BE RETURNING, WE WILL IN PRINCIPLE WISH TO ASSIST IN WHAT WE HOPE WILL BE AN INTERNATIONAL EFFORT, DESIRABLY UNDER UN AUSPICES, TO MEET PRESSING NEEDS THERE. FOR INITIAL FUNDING WE BELIEVE WE WILL BE ABLE TO DRAW ON MESRF AND MAY RECHANNEL AID PROGRAMS

ALREADY IN THE WORKS. IN SOME QUARTERS OF CONGRESS, SYMPATHIES ARE GROWING FOR A MAJOR U.S. CONTRIBUTION TO REHABILITATION IN THE SOUTH. ASIDE FROM SATISFYING PRESSING HUMANITARIAN, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC NEEDS IN SUCH A PROGRAM, THE RETURN OF THE MASS OF LEBANESE DISPLACED PERSONS WOULD TEND TO REINFORCE THE STABILITY WE HOPE TO ACHIEVE EVENTUALLY THROUGH THE UNIFIL OPERATION AND THE RESTORATION OF LEBANESE GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY.

16. U.S. MILITARY SURVEY TEAM: WE PROBABLY RPT PROBABLY WILL BE SENDING, PERHAPS AS EARLY AS THIS WEEKEND, A SMALL US MILITARY SURVEY TEAM. THIS TEAM WAS TO BE SENT IN ORDER TO SURVEY THE LEBANESE ARMY'S NEEDS AND TO SEE HOW OUR PLANNED THREE-YEAR PROGRAM OF DOLS 100 MILLION IN FMS CREDIT COULD BEST BE EMPLOYED. ITS DISPATCH TO
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LEBANON HAS BEEN POSTPONED ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS BY

FIGHTING IN BEIRUT AND THEN BY THE SOUTH LEBANON PROBLEM. THE TEAM WILL BE ACTING WITHIN LIMITED TERMS OF REFERENCE AND WILL HAVE NO MISSION TO PERFORM IN CONNECTION WITH THE DEPLOYMENT OF LEBANESE ARMY UNITS TO THE SOUTH. ADDRESSEES SHOULD VOLUNTEER NO INFORMATION ON THIS TEAM, EXCEPT FOR EMBASSY DAMASCUS WHICH HAS ALREADY BEEN AUTHORIZED TO DO SO, SINCE WE WISH TO KEEP THE TEAM'S PROFILE AS LOW AS POSSIBLE; HOWEVER, YOU CAN OFFER THE ABOVE INFORMATION IF GOVERNMENTS OR THE UN ASK.

17. U.S. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO LEBANESE ARMY: USUN SHOULD EXPLAIN TO TUEINI THAT, WHEN WE FIRST DEVELOPED CONCEPT OF FMS CREDIT PROGRAM TO ASSIST IN REBUILDING LEBANESE ARMY, WE MADE CLEAR WE WOULD NOT ESTABLISH A MILITARY TRAINING MISSION IN LEBANON. THESE ASSURANCES WERE GIVEN TO CONGRESS. WE ARE PROVIDING SUBSTANTIAL FUNDS FOR TRAINING IN THE U.S. (DOLS 600,000 IN FY 78). WE THINK IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO ESTABLISH THE VISIBLE US MILITARY PRESENCE IN LEBANON AS TUEINI SUGGESTED, BUT DO NOT WANT TO RULE OUT TRAINING IN LEBANON UNDER UN OR OTHER AUSPICES.

18. ROLE OF THE CHRISTIAN MILITIAS: IN AN EARLY SEPTEL, WE WILL BE ANALYZING HOW WE MIGHT APPROACH THE TROUBLESOME PROBLEM OF THE CHRISTIAN MILITIAS AND THE ROLE WEIZMAN ENVISAGES FOR THEM.

19. FOR THE MOMENT, HOWEVER, EMBASSY TEL AVIV SHOULD CONTINUE TO TAKE THE LINE CONSISTENT WITH WHAT WE SAID LAST YEAR WHEN WE WERE TRYING TO BRING ABOUT A PALESTINIAN WITHDRAWAL AND THINNING OUT IN SOUTHERN LEBANON: (A) ISRAEL SHOULD PRESSURE THE MILITIA COMMANDERS TO COOPERATE WITH UNIFIL AND WITH LEBANESE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES, WHETHER MILITARY OR CIVIL; (B) WE HOPE THE LEBANESE

GOVERNMENT AND THE MILITIA COMMANDERS WILL WORK OUT
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PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS, AND THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WILL BE ENCOURAGED TO MOVE IN THIS DIRECTION; (C) CERTAIN PRAGMATIC UNDERSTANDINGS MAY HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT ALSO BETWEEN THE LEBANESE AND THE ISRAELIS UNDER UN AUSPICES; (D) CERTAIN PRAGMATIC UNDERSTANDINGS MAY BE POSSIBLE AS LONG AS THERE IS DECENT RESPECT FOR LEBANON'S SENSE OF DIGNITY AND SOVEREIGNTY, AND THIS REQUIRES THE ISRAELIS TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT IN THEIR PUBLIC POSITIONS. CONSISTENT WITH THIS POSITION, YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT SUCH STEP AS HADDAD'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ARMY OF SOUTHERN LEBANON AND HIS CONSCRIPTION MEASURES HAS BEEN DISTINCTLY UNHELPFUL IN THE PRESENT SITUATION.

20. BEIRUT 1685 JUST RECEIVED AGAIN REMINDS US THAT, IN ADDITION TO OTHER OBSTACLES TO LEBANESE ARMY DEPLOYMENT, LEBANESE THEMSELVES ARE STILL UNDECIDED AS TO WHERE THEY MIGHT BEST BE POSITIONED. GIVEN THE CURRENT UNRESOLVED ROLE OF THE CHRISTIAN MILITIAS, OUR OWN THOUGHT IS THAT LEBANESE ARMY UNITS, INCLUDING LIAISON AND TOKEN DETAILS IF THIS IS THE BEST THAT CAN BE ACHIEVED RIGHT AWAY, SHOULD GO INITIALLY WITH UNIFIL UNITS INTO THE BUFFER ZONE ABOVE THE CHRISTIAN MILITIA ZONE. LEBANESE NEGOTIATIONS WITH HADDAD WILL HAVE TO BE UNDERTAKEN BEFORE ANY LEBANESE ARMY MOVES INTO THE CHRISTIAN MILITIA AREAS COULD BE CONSIDERED SERIOUSLY. WE ALSO DO NOT WANT THE LEBANESE ARMY TO FACE A CHALLENGE FROM THE MILITIAS. PERHAPS NAQURAH MIGHT BE AN EXCEPTION, HOWEVER, IF IT HAS NOT ALREADY BEEN TAKEN OVER BY CHRISTIAN MILITIA UNITS.

21. RE PARA 2 ABOVE, WALDHEIM HAS ALREADY ISSUED STATEMENT. COOPER
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INFO RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0000

USINT BAGHDAD

AMEMBASSY DOHA

AMEMBASSY MANAMA

AMEMBASSY MUSCAT

AMEMBASSY SANA

S E C R E T STATE 079930

EXDIS

FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 079930 SENT ACTION USUN NEW YORK
BEIRUT TEL AVIV DAMASCUS JERUSALEM USDEL SECRETARY ANKARA
INFO AMMAN CAIRO JIDDA KUWAIT LONDON PARIS TEHRAN OTTAWA
OSLO STOCKHOLM KATHMANDU MAR 29.
QUOTE S E C R E T STATE 079930 TOSEC 030027

EXDIS - ANKARA FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY

E.O. 11652: XGDS 1 AND 2

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3. PUTTING LEBANESE ARMY AS WELL AS LEBANESE POLICE, GENDARMERIE, CUSTOMS, AND CIVIL AUTHORITY INTO THE SOUTH EXPEDITIOUSLY: THIS REMAINS THE MOST IMMEDIATE, PRESSING OBJECTIVE. EMBASSY BEIRUT MUST CONTINUE FIRMLY AND PERSISTENTLY TO URGE THE PROMPTTEST POSSIBLE TRANSFER OF AT LEAST SOME MILITARY UNITS TO THE SOUTH. THE SYRIANS SUPPORT SUCH A MOVE (DAMASCUS 1723), AND SAY THAT THE PALESTINIANS ARE WILLING TO COOPERATE. SIILASVUO HAS MADE ABUNDANTLY CLEAR HE NEEDS THESE FORCES, AND THE ANTICIPATED

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STEPS UP TO HELP IN WHAT WE THINK WILL BE AN ESSENTIAL SCREENING PROCESS (SEE BELOW).

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USE BY LEBANESE GOVERNMENT IN HANDLING THE SITUATION OF 170,000 PLUS DISPLACED PEOPLE FROM THE SOUTH. WE ARE CONSULTING IN BEIRUT WITH LEBANESE GOVERNMENT, UN VOLUNTARY AGENCIES, AND OTHERS ALSO INVOLVED IN THIS RELIEF EFFORT. WE ARE PREPARED TO DO MORE, DRAWING ON AID'S DISASTER RELIEF FUND.

15. RESETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION ASSISTANCE IN SOUTHERN LEBANON: IF AND WHEN THE SITUATION IN SOUTHERN LEBANON STABILIZES TO THE POINT WHERE THE GREAT MASS OF DISPLACED PEOPLE WILL BE RETURNING, WE WILL IN PRINCIPLE WISH TO ASSIST IN WHAT WE HOPE WILL BE AN INTERNATIONAL EFFORT, DESIRABLY UNDER UN AUSPICES, TO MEET PRESSING NEEDS THERE. FOR INITIAL FUNDING WE BELIEVE WE WILL BE ABLE TO DRAW ON MESRF AND MAY RECHANNEL AID PROGRAMS ALREADY IN THE WORKS. IN SOME QUARTERS OF CONGRESS, SYMPATHIES ARE GROWING FOR A MAJOR U.S. CONTRIBUTION TO REHABILITATION IN THE SOUTH. ASIDE FROM SATISFYING PRESSING HUMANITARIAN, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC NEEDS IN SUCH A PROGRAM, THE RETURN OF THE MASS OF LEBANESE DISPLACED PERSONS WOULD TEND TO REINFORCE THE STABILITY WE HOPE TO ACHIEVE EVENTUALLY THROUGH THE UNIFIL OPERATION AND THE RESTORATION OF LEBANESE GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY.

16. U.S. MILITARY SURVEY TEAM: WE PROBABLY RPT PROBABLY WILL BE SENDING, PERHAPS AS EARLY AS THIS WEEKEND, A SMALL US MILITARY SURVEY TEAM. THIS TEAM WAS TO BE SENT IN ORDER TO SURVEY THE LEBANESE ARMY'S NEEDS AND TO SEE HOW OUR PLANNED THREE-YEAR PROGRAM OF DOLS 100 MILLION IN FMS CREDIT COULD BEST BE EMPLOYED. ITS DISPATCH TO

LEBANON HAS BEEN POSTPONED ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS BY

FIGHTING IN BEIRUT AND THEN BY THE SOUTH LEBANON PROBLEM.

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THE TEAM WILL BE ACTING WITHIN LIMITED TERMS OF REFERENCE AND WILL HAVE NO MISSION TO PERFORM IN CONNECTION WITH THE DEPLOYMENT OF LEBANESE ARMY UNITS TO THE SOUTH. ADDRESSEES SHOULD VOLUNTEER NO INFORMATION ON THIS TEAM, EXCEPT FOR EMBASSY DAMASCUS WHICH HAS ALREADY BEEN AUTHORIZED TO DO SO, SINCE WE WISH TO KEEP THE TEAM'S PROFILE AS LOW AS POSSIBLE; HOWEVER, YOU CAN OFFER THE ABOVE INFORMATION IF GOVERNMENTS OR THE UN ASK.

17. U.S. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO LEBANESE ARMY: USUN SHOULD EXPLAIN TO TUEINI THAT, WHEN WE FIRST DEVELOPED CONCEPT OF FMS CREDIT PROGRAM TO ASSIST IN REBUILDING LEBANESE ARMY, WE MADE CLEAR WE WOULD NOT ESTABLISH A MILITARY TRAINING MISSION IN LEBANON. THESE ASSURANCES WERE GIVEN TO CONGRESS. WE ARE PROVIDING SUBSTANTIAL FUNDS FOR TRAINING IN THE U.S. (DOLS 600,000 IN FY 78). WE THINK IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO ESTABLISH THE VISIBLE US MILITARY PRESENCE IN LEBANON AS TUEINI SUGGESTED, BUT DO NOT WANT TO RULE OUT TRAINING IN LEBANON UNDER UN OR OTHER AUSPICES.

18. ROLE OF THE CHRISTIAN MILITIAS: IN AN EARLY SEPTEL, WE WILL BE ANALYZING HOW WE MIGHT APPROACH THE TROUBLESOME PROBLEM OF THE CHRISTIAN MILITIAS AND THE ROLE WEIZMAN ENVISAGES FOR THEM.

19. FOR THE MOMENT, HOWEVER, EMBASSY TEL AVIV SHOULD CONTINUE TO TAKE THE LINE CONSISTENT WITH WHAT WE SAID LAST YEAR WHEN WE WERE TRYING TO BRING ABOUT A PALESTINIAN WITHDRAWAL AND THINNING OUT IN SOUTHERN LEBANON: (A) ISRAEL SHOULD PRESSURE THE MILITIA COMMANDERS TO COOPERATE WITH UNIFIL AND WITH LEBANESE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES, WHETHER MILITARY OR CIVIL; (B) WE HOPE THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND THE MILITIA COMMANDERS WILL WORK OUT PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS, AND THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WILL BE ENCOURAGED TO MOVE IN THIS DIRECTION; (C) CERTAIN PRAGMATIC UNDERSTANDINGS MAY HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT ALSO

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BETWEEN THE LEBANESE AND THE ISRAELIS UNDER UN AUSPICES; (D) CERTAIN PRAGMATIC UNDERSTANDINGS MAY BE POSSIBLE AS LONG AS THERE IS DECENT RESPECT FOR LEBANON'S SENSE OF DIGNITY AND SOVEREIGNTY, AND THIS REQUIRES THE ISRAELIS TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT IN THEIR PUBLIC POSITIONS. CONSISTENT WITH THIS POSITION, YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT SUCH STEP AS HADDAD'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE ESTABLISHMENT

OF AN ARMY OF SOUTHERN LEBANON AND HIS CONSCRIPTION MEASURES HAS BEEN DISTINCTLY UNHELPFUL IN THE PRESENT SITUATION.

20. BEIRUT 1685 JUST RECEIVED AGAIN REMINDS US THAT, IN ADDITION TO OTHER OBSTACLES TO LEBANESE ARMY DEPLOYMENT, LEBANESE THEMSELVES ARE STILL UNDECIDED AS TO WHERE THEY MIGHT BEST BE POSITIONED. GIVEN THE CURRENT UNRESOLVED ROLE OF THE CHRISTIAN MILITIAS, OUR OWN THOUGHT IS THAT LEBANESE ARMY UNITS, INCLUDING LIAISON AND TOKEN DETAILS IF THIS IS THE BEST THAT CAN BE ACHIEVED RIGHT AWAY, SHOULD GO INITIALLY WITH UNIFIL UNITS INTO THE BUFFER ZONE ABOVE THE CHRISTIAN MILITIA ZONE. LEBANESE NEGOTIATIONS WITH HADDAD WILL HAVE TO BE UNDERTAKEN BEFORE ANY LEBANESE ARMY MOVES INTO THE CHRISTIAN MILITIA AREAS COULD BE CONSIDERED SERIOUSLY. WE ALSO DO NOT WANT THE LEBANESE ARMY TO FACE A CHALLENGE FROM THEMILITIAS. PERHAPS NAQURAH MIGHT BE AN EXCEPTION, HOWEVER, IF IT HAS NOT ALREADY BEEN TAKEN OVER BY CHRISTIAN MILITIA UNITS.

21. RE PARA 2 ABOVE, WALDHEIM HAS ALREADY ISSUED STATEMENT. COOPER UNQUOTE COOPER

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